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Abstract
In the normal presentation of the EPR problem a comparison is made
between the (weak) Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics
which seems to suggest that at times action at a distance may take place,
and the hidden parameter interpretation which must satisfy Bell’s in-
equality, in contradiction to the predictions of quantum mechanics. In
this paper, we consider a relativistic approach to the paradox. However,
the frame of reference under consideration is not the usual Lorenz frame
but rather the spin frame of reference which is invariant with respect to
the SU(2) group.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Before giving an alternative approach to the EPR problem, we must first be clear
as to what the paradox is and what a proper solution should entail: Consider two
particles emitted in the singlet state. Let λ1 be the measurement of spin made
on particle 1 in the direction ~n1. By definition of a singlet state, a measurement
of the spin of particle 2 will yield the value λ1, if measured in the same direction
~n1, a fact also observed in experiment.
The paradox arises when two competing epistemological views of reality are
brought to bear on the matter. In the naive realist interpretation [10] (as it has
come to be called) the particles have a definite predetermined spin value. From
this perspective, reality can be known by simply “looking” at it[6]. What we
see is really what is there, and moreover, based on these assumptions, a naive
realist can construct a mathematical model of spin which gives rise either to
Bell’s inequality [3] or the GHZ theorem [9]. In either case, a mathematical
contradiction arises which cannot be explained by naive realism.
The weak Copenhagen interpretation of QM, on the other hand, also runs
into a difficulty. At the core of this interpretation is the projection postulate
which effectively says that the act of measurement forces the particle to choose
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between the two alternatives. However, if this is the case, it means that the
particles in the singlet state choose equal but opposite values on measurement,
although communication between the particles has been eliminated. This state
of affairs is normally explained by saying that the interaction is “non-local”
which is equivalent to saying that there is action at a distance, and some perhaps
would interpret this to mean that cause and effect have broken down.
Therein lies the paradox. Naive realism gives rise to a contradiction while
the projection postulate, if taken literally gives rise to action at a distance,
which appears to be a violation of relativity theory.
The epistemological approach taken here is to view the spin state as preex-
isting while at the same time considering the measured value of the spin as an
SU(2) relativity effect correlated to the direction of measurement, a fact pre-
viously noted in other publications [5, 7]. In other words, the same spin state
can be interpreted as +1 or -1 depending on our point of view. Consequently,
as we shall see below, this permits two different values to be assigned to the
same event, and will result in Bell’s inequality, if the SU(2) relativity effect is
ignored.
An analogy might help. The Earth as viewed from the North pole can be seen
as rotating in an anti-clockwise direction (-1), while the same state of motion can
be viewed as being in a clockwise direction (+1), if viewed from the South pole.
However, in the notation of quantum mechanics this same event, as seen from
the equator, cannot be interpreted in a consistent way and it is this inconsistency
that gives rise to both Bell’s inequality and the GHZ result. In other words, the
same state can take on two different values, depending on the viewpoint and
since the essence of Bell’s inequality involves correlations from three different
directions, its a prime candidate for bringing forth inconsistencies, unless this
SU(2) relativity effect is taken into account [5]. Another useful analogy is to
envisage a Mobius strip and ask what is the orientation of the surface? It
has no orientation, although from any one perspective it can be considered a
“two-faced”surface. Once again, orientation depends on the point of view [7].
2 DIFFERENT REPRESENTATIONS
The first thing to grasp is that there are two equal but different representations
of spin. Specifically, consider the following:(
1 0
0 −1
)(
1
0
)
=
( −1 0
0 1
)( −1
0
)
(1)
which means that (
1
0
)
= −
( −1
0
)
. (2)
It is clear that if the ket |s〉 represents the spin state and U ∈ SU(2) then
〈s|U∗U |s〉 is invariant regardless of the representation. This is what we mean
by SU(2) spin invariance. We now separately analyze each representation. Fol-
lowing the notation of Greenberger et al [9], we can write |~n,+〉 and |~n,−〉 to
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represent spin-up and spin-down respectively along the ~n direction. Therefore,
|~n1,+〉 = (cos θ/2) |~n2,+〉+ (sin θ/2) |~n2,−〉 . (3)
Now choose ~n2 by rotating through θ = π/2 (clockwise) with respect to ~n1 and
choose ~n3 by rotating through θ = −π/2 (anti-clockwise) with respect to ~n1
(Fig. 1). Then equation (3) gives
|~n1,+〉 = 1/
√
2 |~n2,+〉+ 1/
√
2 |~n2,−〉 (4)
= 1/
√
2 |~n3,+〉 − 1/
√
2 |~n3,−〉 . (5)
|~n1,+〉
|~n2,+〉 |~n2,−〉
|~n3,+〉 |~n3,−〉
Fig. 1
In particular if |~n1,+〉 =
(
1
0
)
, then
|~n2,+〉 =
(
1/
√
2
1/
√
2
)
and |~n2,−〉 =
(
1/
√
2
−1/√2
)
, and |~n3,+〉 =
(
1/
√
2
−1/√2
)
and |~n3,−〉 =
( −1/√2
−1/√2
)
. Note, immediately that 〈~n2,±|~n3,±〉 = 0 and
|n2,−〉 = |n3,+〉. This creates the ambivalent situation of identifying, from the
perspective of ~n1, a spin-up state (|n2,−〉) with a spin-down state (|n3,+〉),
which forces the obvious question, as to what is the meaning of up or down
in this case. In fact from the perspective of ~n1 alone there is no consistent
meaning; for the value depends not only on the direction ~n1 but on the choice
of angle θ defined relative to ~n1. It is precisely this ambivalence that is at the
heart of the GHZ inconsistency and Bell’s inequality.
3 COPENHAGEN OR REALISM
In the light of the above relativistic approach, we now ask how the above process
can be viewed from both the perspective of Bell’s original paper on hidden
variables [3] and from the perspective of the (weak) Copenhagen interpretation.
Bell assumes that “if the two measurements are made at places remote from one
another the orientation of one magnet does not influence the result obtained with
the other”(II Formulation), and suggests that if this “locality” hypothesis fails
then “the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are incompatible with
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separable, [local] predetermination” (V. Generalization). This calls for some
comments and observations.
(1) The word “influence”in the first quote can have two meanings. One
meaning can refer to a physical “influence” between the two magnets, typified
by some type of physical communication as in the case of an electromagnetic
transmission. The other “influence” can come from a type of knowledge associ-
ated with the rules of conditional probability and SU(2) relativity.
(2) In this paper, the term “influence” is only been used in the second sense,
which means we are assuming no physical contact between the magnets and the
Lorentz invariance is always maintained with respect to space-time.
(3) The second type of influence allows for instantaneous knowledge of physi-
cal events beyond the light cone, without in anyway violating the laws of physics
or causality. To understand this better, let us consider the following analogous
example. Alice and Bob are each given a sealed envelope containing one of two
possible cards. Alice’s envelope contains the Ace of Hearts, while Bob’s envelope
contains the Ace of Spades. Each one of them is sent on a long train journey
going in opposite directions and are told to open their envelopes after one hour.
If Alice were asked, prior to opening her envelope, the probability that Bob
had the Ace of Hearts she would answer 1/2. However, if she were asked the
same questions, after she had opened her envelope, she would have responded
0. In other words, by Alice opening her first envelope, her new found knowledge
“influences” the probability outcome of Bob’s experiment. Knowledge, of the
content of her envelope gives her instantaneous knowledge of Bob’s envelope.
However, this “influence” is grounded in the rules of conditional probability and
the law of large numbers, without in any way violating the rules of causality.
Alice is not free to communicate her instantaneous knowledge to Bob in an
instantaneous way. Communication is subjected to Lorentz invariance.
Similarly, in an analogous way, when one component of spin is measured in a
singlet state, we not only instantaneously know the other but spin values can be
preassigned by nature prior to the experiment, although not necessarily in any
deterministic way. Moreover, precisely because of the SU(2) relativity effect (as
described previously), preassigned eigenstates (in a direction ~n1) cannot be used
to mathematically determine the preassigned eigenstates of another direction,
~n2. Hence, our inability to determine the values of preassigned states, is in
full agreement with Bell’s assertion that “the statistical predictions of quantum
mechanics are incompatible with separable predetermination” of observed values
by means of a mathematical formula. However, it would not be in agreement
with the assertion that “the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics are
incompatible with separable predetermination” in an ontological sense. In other
words, nature obeys the rules of causality but not necessarily in any systematic
way that precludes chance, nor in any absolute way to preclude relativity by
determining absolute values.
(4) Bell has rightly assumed that “non-locality” implies “no separable prede-
termination” of spin values by means of a mathematical formula based on hidden
parameters. However, he also seems to imply a fallacy, when he concludes the
opposite, namely that a theory which involves “no separable predetermination”
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of spin values could not be “Lorentz invariant”. In contrast, this paper has
pointed out, that SU(2) relativity implies that there is no separable predeter-
mination of measurable spin values by mathematical means but yet the theory
is still local and hence Lorentz invariant. This means that for any arbitrar-
ily chosen direction, the spin values are preassigned prior to the experiment.
However, precisely because of the SU(2) relativity effect (as described above),
preassigned eigenstates in one direction (~n1) cannot be used to determine preas-
signed eigenstates in another (~n2). Nevertheless, cause and effect are preserved
but not systematically. The rules of chance always apply, and values cannot be
assigned to spin in an absolute way, for the same reason absolute mass cannot be
assigned to each of the particles. Finally, note that the SU(2) frame of reference
allows us to determine not the actual outcome of the experiment but rather the
probability distribution for the spin-observables of the pre-correlated states.
(5) The Copenhagen interpretation will also undergo modifications, depend-
ing on how one interprets the projection postulate. To better understand the
nature of the collapsed wave function and conditional probability, we return to
the probability experiment with Alice and Bob. The initial state (for the Ace
of Hearts and the Ace of Spades) is given by
|ψ〉 = |Ah〉 |As〉+ |As〉 |Ah〉 . (6)
However, once either one of the envelopes are open, the state changes (or col-
lapses) for the person opening the envelope into either |ψ〉 = |Ah〉 ⊗ |As〉 or
|ψ〉 = |As〉 ⊗ |Ah〉 Note this is a consequence of conditional probability the-
ory and a natural explanation can be given in terms of moving from ignorance
to knowledge, without in any way suggesting that causality has been violated.
Similarly, in quantum mechanics an analogous situation arises, although the
property of rotational invariance and SU(2) relativity involves purely a quan-
tum phenomenon.
To summarize, from the perspective of this paper while the principle of su-
perposition as prescribed by the Copenhagen convention still remains and the
initial quantum state is best written as a complete set of eigenvectors, it does
not follow that the act of measuring alone determines the observed eigenstate.
Rather the measuring devices because of its anisotropic nature, selects one of
the preexisting eigenstates as an axis of rotation, thus fixing the preassigned
information along that axis, while breaking the preassigned correlated informa-
tion in other directions because of the rotation effect. Moreover, the anisotropic
measurement increases our knowledge of the situation in a given direction, while
at the same time destroying information about the initial isotropic state. From
a probability point of view, we can say that the measuring device imposes a
Markov condition on the newly emerging state by disentangling the singlet.
Moreover, once an observation is made, the observed measurement can be iden-
tified with the collapsed wave function in accordance with the mathematical
rules for projection operators.
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4 INEQUALITIES TO EQUALITIES
In view of the above, we now re-formulate Bell’s perspective from the perspective
of SU(2)relativity. In Bell’s original paper, he argues that for a system of par-
ticles in the singlet state the expectation E(λ
(1)
i λ
(2)
j ), identified with “hidden”
parameters, is never equal to the quantum expectation
〈
σ
(1)
i σ
(2)
j
〉
where the (1)
and (2) refer to particle 1 and 2 respectively. We now proceed to calculate this
expected value, E(λ
(1)
i λ
(2)
j ), of the spin measured on a coupled system of parti-
cles, in the directions ~ni and ~nj . Recall ~ni.~nj = cos θij . Let P (λ
(1)
i , λ
(2)
j ) be the
joint distribution function associated with the two directions of measurement
then since the particles are in the singlet state
E(λ
(1)
i λ
(2)
j ) =
∑
λ
(1)
i λ
(2)
j P (λ
(1)
i , λ
(2)
j ) (7)
=
∑
λ
(1)
i P1(λ
(1)
i )λ
(2)
j Pji(λ
(2)
j |λ(1)i ) (8)
= (1)(
1
2
)(−1) cos2(θij
2
) + (−1)(1
2
)(1) cos2(
θij
2
)
+(1)(
1
2
)(1) sin2(
θij
2
) + (1)(
1
2
)(1) sin2(
θij
2
) (9)
= − cos2 θij
2
+ sin2
θij
2
(10)
= − cos θij (11)
= −~ni.~nj (12)
=
〈
σ
(1)
i σ
(2)
j
〉
. (13)
Note our equation (7) is identical in form to equation (2) of Bell’s paper while
our equation (12)and (13) are identical to equation (3) of Bell’s paper. In our
case, however, both equations (7),(12) and (13) coincide while in Bell’s paper
they do not. This difference stems from the fact that Bell does not prioritize the
direction of the measuring magnetic field when dealing with hidden parameters
and his derivation presupposes that three independent measurements can be
made in three different and arbitrary directions without consideration of the
SU(2) reference frame. Wigner’s derivation of a comparable inequality to that
of Bell’s rests on the same fallacy [11].
5 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, note that the epistemological model presented in this paper
presents no difficulty in assigning a real objective state to the elementary par-
ticle. However, a numerical assignment of values to this objective state should
(1) take into account the SU(2) relativity of the situation,
(2) realize that such a state can be measured,
(3) recognize that the measurement changes the system by redefining the initial
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conditions (the uncertainty principle),
(4) understand the limited way in which the singlet state allows us to take a
second measurement of the initial system.
This last point takes us back to Einstein’s original version of the EPR para-
dox which was formulated in terms of position and momentum and not spin [3].
From the perspective of this paper, Einstein was partially correct. Realism still
exists in nature and the projection postulate of QM, if viewed from the (weak)
Copenhagen perspective, violates this realism. It is unfortunate, therefore, that
the measurement of spin itself has become the standard for testing the paradox.
It seems to me that in reality the Alain Aspect [1] experiment and other such
experiments challenge the naive realist interpretation of quantum mechanics,
but they do not prove Einstein’s position to be incorrect. Naive realism is not
realism, it is just a flawed model of reality. SU(2) relativity not only removes
the inconsistency associated with naive realism by preserving locality, but also
seriously challenges the “action at a distance” associated with the weak Copen-
hagen interpretation. Indeed, from this perspective Einstein’s objection is still
valid.
On the other hand, Einstein’s rejection of the statistical basis of quantum
mechanics stemming from the (weak) Copenhagen interpretation cannot, in my
opinion, be fully justified. A rejection of the projection postulate cannot be
used to reject a statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics. In the above
model, the quantum state actually exists in an ontological way, as an element
of physical reality. It results from more than just our lack of knowledge of
initial conditions, as suggested by the ensemble interpretation associated with
Einstein. 1Indeed, the dynamical properties of spin are not only affected by the
measuring process, as exemplified in the case of the spin-singlet state becoming
disentangled, but they do so in such a way as to maintain realism while avoiding
the difficulties associated with Bell’s inequality.
Specifically, SU(2) relativity combined with conditional probability theory
and the projection postulate, not only guarantee realism but also the necessity
of a statistical interpretation of physical reality, associated with Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle. In essence the uncertainty relations are a proof that a
complete set of initial conditions can never in principle be fully specified, be-
cause the act of measurement itself changes the original system. It is precisely
this inability to specify precise initial conditions that allows a probability theory
to emerge. In this context, Lindsey and Margenau note that the principle of
indeterminacy in QM “is much more thoroughgoing, for it converts a question
of convenience into a matter of necessity. It expresses the conviction ultimately
that we shall never in any case be able to carry out even in principle the mea-
surement necessary for the exact determination of boundary conditions in any
physical problem”[2]. It then follows from this that “ignorance of them [bound-
ary conditions] forces us back on probability considerations”[2].
Finally on a philosophical level we have modified the weak Copenhagen
1Although, it should be pointed out that the (weak) interpretation, is also subjected to
the law of large numbers and can also be viewed from the ensemble perspective.
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interpretation of quantum mechanics with regards to its interpretation of the
projection postulate and its failure to grasp SU(2) relativity. Our interpretation
is based on a critical realist approach which takes the given data to be objective,
without falling into some Newtonian dualistic interpretation of reality. We do
not put the observer outside of the world he is observing as is the approach
in classical mechanics or hidden variable theory (naive realism being a case in
point), nor do we go to the other extreme of giving a singular importance to
the observer as in the Copenhagen interpretation. The measurement of spin is
itself a SU(2) relativity effect. We interact with the physical world because we
are part of the physical world and indeed it is precisely this interaction that
permits us to do physics. The laws of interaction are part of the objective
laws of the universe and are there to be discovered. Quantum physics has tried
to incorporate those interactions pertaining to physics into its axioms. To the
extent that it has succeeded, quantum mechanics gives a more real and objective
picture of physical reality, the uncertainty relations being a case in point. To
the extent that these axioms are not yet complete (the projection postulate),
quantum mechanics should be willing to modify its basic axioms in the light of
the evidence.
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